This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, the development of financial markets and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, investor protection promotes financial development by raising confidence and reducing the costs of external financing. Developed financial systems spread risks among financiers and firms, allocating them to the agents bearing them the best. Therefore, financial development plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between financial development and income inequality is hump- 
Introduction
A recent literature on law and finance has shown that investor protection plays a significant role in promoting the development of financial markets (see Acemoglu and shift risks onto the parties that can best bear them (see Castro et al., 2004) . Several works have recognized the importance of financial development for various macroeconomic variables such as growth and productivity (see, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2001 for a survey). However, this growing literature has not recognized that the changes in risk-taking behavior of investors and firms, associated with better shareholder protection, may also affect income inequality. The data suggest indeed that these variables are correlated. As shown by Table 1 , for a sample of sixty-eight countries observed between 1980 and 2000, the Gini coefficient of the net income distribution is on average 10% higher (at the 5% significance level) in countries where financial markets are more developed. 1 Controlling for average human capital, one of the most important determinants of inequality, this difference rises to 14% (now significant at the 1% significance level). 2 Table 1 also shows that countries with more developed financial markets tend to have better institutions aimed at investor protection. 3 This paper investigates the link between investor protection, financial development and income inequality, both theoretically and empirically. It proposes a simple model where investor protection promotes financial development, thereby improving risk sharing.
This induces more risk-taking in the economy and better insurance on individual earnings, which affect income inequality in opposite ways. The relationships predicted by the model are then confronted with the data.
To formalize these ideas, I construct a general equilibrium two-period overlapping generations model. Agents are risk averse and heterogeneous in their entrepreneurial ability.
They face a choice between a safe and a risky technology, and entrepreneurial ability af-1 I refer to the ratio of stock market capitalization over credit to the private sector as an indicator of financial development. This ratio measures the weight of equity-finance on overall borrowings, and is well suited to capture the risk sharing function of financial development. It is frequently used for this purpose in the literature (see Rajan and Zingales, 2002) . 2 GiniHC in Table 1 is Gini−βHC, whereβ is the OLS estimate from the regression: Ginii = α+ βHCi+ i. HC is human capital, proxied by the share of the population aged above 25 with some secondary education (from Barro and Lee, 2001 ). The results do not change if I also control for the Kuznets' hypothesis by including real per capita GDP and its square, and for geography by including dummy variables. These results are available upon request. 3 The index of investor protection is taken from La Porta et al. (2003) and accounts for measures aimed at transparency (accounting and disclosure requirements) and the enforcement of private contracts. Note. A country is labeled High Smcap if its ratio of stock market capitalization over credit to the private sector is above cross-sectional average. The resutls are robust to the adoption of the median as a threshold. Gini coefficients refer to the distribution of net per capita income, Gini HC are controlled for human capital. Means and differences are reported for each variable, with standard errors in parenthesis. * * * and * * indicate that the difference is positive at the 1 and 5 per cent significance level. (a) the sample is reduced to 18 and 24 countries with Low and High Smcap, respectively. Sample period is 1980-2000. fects the probability of success in the risky project. I assume that financial markets are subject to imperfections arising from the non-observability of output to financiers and that measures of investor protection can be adopted to amend these frictions. In particular, by promoting transparency, investor protection makes misreporting output costly for entrepreneurs. 4 For instance, this cost can be thought of as the extra-compensation the advisory firm charges to certify a falsified book. Better guarantees generate more confidence among investors, thereby making them more willing to bear risk and insure the entrepreneurs. In turn, investors can spread the individual risk by holding diversified portfolios of risky activities. As a result, financial systems with stronger investor protection allow higher degrees of risk sharing. Finally, I rule out wealth heterogeneity, so that all inequality is due to idiosyncratic factors (ability), financial market conditions and income risk. Under these assumptions, better investor protection promotes financial development and affects income inequality in three ways. (i) It improves risk sharing, thereby reducing income volatility for a given size of the risky sector; (ii) it raises the share of the population exposed to earning risk; and (iii) it increases the reward to ability. (i) tends to reduce inequality, while it is increased by (ii) and (iii).
The main result of the paper is that income inequality is a hump-shaped function of investor protection and financial development. Any improvement upon a low level investor protection increases risk taking more than risk sharing, thereby driving inequality up.
However, when investor protection is sufficiently high, any further improvement is more effective on risk sharing than risk taking, hence reduces income inequality.
To make the predictions of the model more easily testable, I assume that there are only two financial instruments, which I label equity and debt. Equity makes risk sharing between investors and entrepreneurs possible, depending on the degree of investor protection, while debt does not. 5 In this way, financial development is captured by the thickness of the equity market, which is also a common empirical measure of financial development (see Rajan and Zingales, 2002 , among others). Then, the testable predictions of the model will be that (1) stock market size grows with investor protection, (2) there is a hump-shaped relationship between income inequality and the thickness of the equity market, and (3) investor protection affects inequality only through stock market development. I provide empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-nine countries and a panel of fifty-two countries over the period 1976-2000 in support of these results.
The contribution of this paper is related to three main strands of literature. Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) , as well as La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 Porta et al. ( , 1999 Porta et al. ( , 2003 , show that institutions aimed at contracting protection (such as those measured by investor_pr in Table 1 ) promote the development of stock markets, but have controversial effects on economic performance. None of these studies has considered income inequality.
Many papers (Beck and Levine, 2002 , Levine, 2002 , Levine and Zervos, 1998 and Zingales, 1998 among others) provide empirical evidence on the link between financial development and macroeconomic variables, such as growth, investments and productivity, but none of them has addressed distributional issues. 6 Theoretical contributions by Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993) , Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) , and Piketty (1997), among others, have proposed explanations for the relationship between financial development, inequality and growth. In most of these models, income inequality originates from heterogeneity in the initial wealth distribution, paired with credit market frictions. As the poorest are subject to credit constraints, they are prevented from making efficient investments in the most productive activities. 7 Over time, capital accumulation determines the dynamics of wealth and income. I depart from this approach by focusing on a different source of ex-ante heterogeneity, namely entrepreneurial ability, and by describing a new mechanism translating differences in ability into income inequality that is independent of accumulation. In particular, I assume productivity to be a function of ability and that entrepreneurs have no wealth for starting their firms. By encouraging investors to ensure entrepreneurs, better investor protection allows the more talented to undertake risky projects, whose payoffs depend on ability. Heterogeneity in productivity, the extent of risk sharing and the size of the risky sector ultimately determine the income distribution.
In this respect, the approach of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) is closer to mine. In their paper, income inequality is generated by managerial incentives, which depend on risk sharing, not by ex-ante wealth heterogeneity. There, risk sharing evolves endogenously over time as a consequence of information accumulation, while here it varies only as an effect of exogenous changes in investor protection.
The only empirical assessments of the relationship between financial development and income inequality are, to my knowledge, Clarke et al. (2003) and Beck et al. (2004) .
Both find evidence of a negative, though non robust, relationship between the degree of financial intermediation and income inequality. The main difference with respect to my empirical analysis lays in the measure of financial development. Instead of financial depth, I use the size of the equity market relative to total credit, which seems better suited to account for the degree of risk sharing allowed by a financial system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model economy is populated by two-period overlapping generations of risk-averse agents. There is no population growth and the measure of each cohort is normalized to one. For simplicity, preferences are represented by the following utility function:
Second-period utility is discounted at the rate β ∈ (0, 1) . There are no bequests.
Intermediate goods sector
Two production processes are available to each young agent: a safe and a risky one.
The safe technology does not employ capital, while the risky one requires a fixed unit investment. Therefore, the individual technological choice is analogous to an occupational choice whereby some agents become "workers" and others "entrepreneurs". In line with empirical findings, I assume that the risky activity, if successful, has higher returns than the safe one and that the probability of success depends on the ability of the entrepreneur. 8 For simplicity, and without much loss of generality, I assume that ability only affects the probability of success and not the payoffs. 9 In particular, production is given by: (2003) for empirical studies on the determinants of entrepreneurial success, mainly among small firms.
9 Ability can be considered as playing a twofold role. It enhances the chance of succeeding in risky enterprises, as assumed in the model. But it may also raise productivity regardless of the riskiness of projects. Introducing this second effect into the model would not affect the results.
where B < A, ϕ ∈ (0, 1) and success is i.i.d. within each group. It follows that there is no aggregate risk and total production of group i equals g (
depending on the technology, safe or risky, in use.
Final good sector
A homogeneous final good Y , used for consumption and investment, is produced by competitive firms using capital and intermediate goods. The intermediate goods produced by all agents are perfect substitutes in production. The aggregate technology has the following Cobb-Douglas form:
where X t is the total amount of intermediate goods, with a unit price of χ t , and K Y t is capital employed in the final good sector. Y t is the numeraire.
Financial sector
Both final good firms and risky entrepreneurs need to borrow capital from the old to produce. Information about technology (A, B, ϕ, α) and individual ability (π i ) is public, but outside financiers cannot observe the outcome of risky activities, x it . Two financial instruments, equity and debt, are available.
Equity is modeled as follows. Upon receiving one unit of capital, each young in group i commits to pay, after production, dividend payouts θ h it and θ l it in case of success and failure, respectively. Once production has occurred, unlucky entrepreneurs can only return the promised amount θ l it x l it χ t . Successful entrepreneurs, instead, may misreport their realization of x it and pay θ l it x l it χ t , pretending to be in the bad state. However, I assume that measures of shareholder protection make misreporting costly. For every unit of hidden cash flow, the entrepreneur incurs a cost p ∈ [0, 1]. Since both ability and technology are common knowledge, either the entire
or nothing is hidden, so that the payoff from misreporting is
Truth-telling is rational as long as its value is at least equal to that of misreporting. Therefore, the equity contract
ª must satisfy the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint:
where v [w t , r t+1 ] is the indirect utility of a young agent with a given income w t and facing an interest rate r t+1 when old.
Debt requires a fixed repayment, R it . In case entrepreneurs are not able (or willing) to pay, bankruptcy enables creditors to obtain min {R it , x it }. 10 Due to log-utility, agents in the risky sector can afford debt financing only as long as output in the bad state is higher than the interest rate. This implies that debt is always repaid and its return equals that of safe loans (R it = r t for any i).
Financial contracts are set to maximize the agents' expected indirect utility, V it , subject to the IC constraint and the outsiders' participation constraint. As for the latter, old agents must be indifferent between the following investments: a portfolio with shares of all group-i firms and safe loans. Risk aversion implies that debt is never optimal for financing risky projects. Furthermore, assuming that firms bear an infinitesimal cost of issuing equity, debt is preferred by the safe firms in the final good sector. Thus, payoffs from the risky technology are determined as the solution to the contracting problem for equities:
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint:
and the old's participation constraint:
Note that a pooled portfolio of i.i.d. shares of group i yields the LHS of (PC) with certainty, so that the old face no uncertainty. 11 
Equilibrium
Firms in the final good sector are perfectly competitive and maximize profits taking prices (r t , χ t ) as given. Each young agent from group i has perfect foresight and chooses how much to save, s (·), and the technology to use (safe or risky), to maximize her expected utility. Thus, each of them solves the following program:
where
Here, w it is realized income, i.e., Bχ t in case the safe technology is chosen, otherwise so that r t and χ t are exogenously given from the world markets, while Y is non traded. 13 Assuming that prices are constant, the economy is always in a steady-state and I can drop all the time indexes. For simplicity, I normalize the price of intermediate goods , such that each agent in group i solves (P1)
-(P2); and the factor employments {K Y , X} that maximize profits in the final good sector.
For simplicity, I assume that ϕA < B+ r < A and ϕA < r. This implies that both safe and risky intermediate projects are run in equilibrium; and when investor protection is absent, nobody chooses the risky technology. 14 
Solution

Final good sector
Profit maximization by competitive firms in the final good sector yields the following demand functions for capital and intermediates:
Later on, I will endogenize interest rate and prices, and show that the main results continue to hold. 1 3 This assumption is immaterial, since factor prices are equalized everywhere. 1 4 This assumption also rules out risky debt. However, it can be shown that removing this restriction would not have any considerable effect on the results.
Young agents
Due to log-utility, the optimal saving function of each young agent is simply a constant fraction (1 + β) −1 of her earnings. To solve for the optimal occupational choice (P 2), an agent born in group i needs to know the payoffs from the risky technology. Therefore, I proceed backwards. First, I derive the optimal equity contracts © θ
under both perfect and imperfect investor protection. Then, I characterize the occupational choice, {T i } i∈ [0, 1] , given the optimal payoffs. Finally, I show how the equilibrium is affected by investor protection.
Optimal equity contract: efficient markets, p = 1
In this case, the payoff from hiding cash flow equals earnings in the bad state,
. This means that there is no incentive for entrepreneurs to misreport, so that investors can act as if they had perfect information about x i . Having a state-invariant income is the first best for risk-averse entrepreneurs. Since outside financiers behave as if they were risk-neutral and perfectly informed, they are willing to provide insiders with full insurance, given that the expected return equals the safe rate. Analytically, the first-order conditions for (P 1) subject to (P C) require: 
e., earnings of entrepreneurs are state invariant:
Optimal equity contract: general case, 0 < p < 1
If investor protection is not perfect, state invariant earnings are not incentive compatible:
entrepreneurs in the good state would be tempted to misreport x i and enjoy the higher utility given by earnings
Investors are aware of this and hence account for it when determining the dividend payouts. In other words, both (IC 0 ) and (P C) must hold with equality, so that
The wedge between state-contingent earnings, i.e. the price for the temptation to misre-port, is decreasing in investor protection. If the cost of hiding profits is high, temptation to misreport is low, as is its price in terms of distance from the first best. The ratio between payoffs and ability is lower than in the efficient case, and increasing in p. This means that, by discouraging misbehavior, investor protection also fosters meritocracy. Expected earnings for entrepreneurs are the same as under perfect investor protection, but expected utility is lower, due to risk aversion. Notice that for p = 0, the payoffs from equity-finance are the same as those implied by a standard debt contract.
ª is the solution to (P 1) .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Investor protection and the equilibrium
Since the dividend payouts © θ Proof. See the Appendix.
Given that the risky technology is financed with equity, the measure of agents who choose it represents the size of the stock market. From Lemmas 1 and 2, it follows that stock market size is a function of investor protection, as stated by Proposition 1.
, is increasing in investor protection, and concave for high p.
Corollary 1 Stock market size as a ratio of GDP is increasing in investor protection and concave for high p.
In the efficient case (p = 1), the value of producing with the risky technology is higher than that of running the safe project whenever
can easily get a closed form solution for the threshold ability,
and verify that it lies in the support of π under the hypotheses that A > B+ r and ϕA < B+ r.
In the general case of imperfect investor protection (p < 1), the expression for the threshold ability is more complicated. However, payoffs are easily derived:
Henceforth, I denote the threshold abilities associated with p = 1 and 0 < p < 1 by π * p=1 and π * p<1 , respectively. For p = 1, perfect risk sharing is achieved through equity financing so that entrepreneurs act as if they were risk-neutral. They choose the risky technology as soon as their ability implies expected earnings equal to the safe ones, i.e. π i = π * p=1 . This means that their earnings are state invariant and exhibit no discontinuity at the threshold ability level. When 0 < p < 1, at π i = π * p<1 the expected productivity of the risky technology needs to be higher than the productivity of the safe technology, because entrepreneurs are risk averse and cannot be fully insured through equity. Figure 2 illustrates the optimal ability-earnings profiles. If there is no investor protection, nobody chooses the risky technology and hence earnings are flat and equal to B.
In the opposite extreme case of p = 1, income of young agents is described by the solid line. It is flat for the less able, who run the safe project, and proportional to ability for the more talented, risky entrepreneurs. Due to perfect risk-sharing, earnings are state invariant. If investor protection drops to 0 < p < 1 (dashed line), equity-finance becomes more costly, thereby inducing the least able among risky entrepreneurs to shift to the safe sector. Graphically, (1) the stock market shrinks, i.e., the flat portion of the earnings profile becomes longer. I define this as the "market size" effect. (2) Proportionality between stochastic payoffs and ability becomes weaker due to higher incentives to misreport, and the wedge between state contingent earnings widens due to worse risk-sharing. I call this, as illustrated by the flatter slope and higher distance between w h ip<1 and w l ip<1 , the "risk sharing" effect. The extent of imperfect risk sharing is captured by the jump in expected earnings at π * p<1 . At any π i ≥ π * p<1 , the expected payoff from the risky technology is
Figure 2: Ability-earnings profiles.
independent of p since, for a given interest rate, the old are indifferent between stocks and loans. However, even though expected earnings are invariant, welfare is higher under perfect investor protection because of risk aversion.
Evaluating income inequality
In this section, I derive the key implications of the model on the overall effect of investor protection on income inequality, through the development of the stock market. To do so, I compute the variance of earnings,
] r, and study how it varies with p. 15 If there is no investor protection, all agents choose the safe technology and thus, the variance is zero. If the cost of hiding cash flow becomes any higher than zero (p=ε), some agents prefer the risky technology and raise funds through equity, thereby driving the stock market size from zero to sm(ε). By the "market size" effect, a share of the economy becomes subject to income risk (having state-contingent earnings), thereby raising the variance of income (analytically, positive terms fall under the integral). Moreover, average earnings grow higher than B, so that also the agents on the flat portion in Figure 2 contribute to raising the variance.
As investor protection improves, "market size" is paired with the "risk sharing" effect, which shrinks the wedge between state-contingent earnings and hence, tends to reduce the variance. Analytically, the "risk sharing" effect tends to reduce the term under integration.
The extent of the "market size" effect is decreasing in investor protection, due to the concavity of sm at high p. On the other hand, risk-sharing becomes more effective, the larger is the share of equity-financed agents. This means that, when investor protection is weak (sm is small), the market-size effect dominates because risk-sharing applies to a small fraction of the economy. Therefore, inequality at first increases with p (and with sm).
When investor protection is perfect, V ar
As p falls any lower than 1 (p = 1− ε), the "market size"
effect drives only few agents out of the risky sector, thereby reducing income inequality by a small amount, since the difference between B, w h (π * ) and w l (π * ) is still slight. The "risk sharing" effect, instead, applies to a large share of the population, and outweighs the "market size" effect, so that there is an increase in income inequality. Therefore, improvements upon an already very good investor protection may in fact reduce inequality, although never below the case of no investor protection. Lemma 3 and Proposition 2 formalize this intuition.
Lemma 3 The variance of earnings is a non-monotonic function of investor protection:
dV ar(w) dp > 0 in a neighborhood of p = 0, and dV ar(w) dp < 0 in a neighborhood of p = 1.
Since, from Proposition 1, sm is continuous and monotonic in p, also the relationship between stock market size and income inequality follows a non-monotonic pattern.
Proposition 2
The relationship between earnings variance and stock market size, sm ≡
dV ar(w) dsm > 0 in a neighborhood of sm(0), and
in a neighborhood of sm (1).
Proof. See the Appendix. This exercise allows me to study the relationship between investor protection, stock market size and income inequality on the whole domain of p and to obtain a more testable version of the prediction in Proposition 2. 16 To simulate the model, I choose parameter values consistently with the restrictions imposed on parameters throughout the paper. 17 I approximate the distribution of ability with a Lognormal(µ,σ) and parametrize the mean and variance of the associated Normal distribution, µ and σ, with values from the actual data. Although ability per se is difficult to measure, it is likely to be reflected in educational attainment. Therefore, I take the sample mean and variance of school years from the Barro and Lee (2000) database of 138 countries in 1995. Since the support of the Lognormal distribution is unbounded from above, it must be truncated to comply with the set-up of the model. I assume the top 0.05 per cent to have ability 1, while π is lognormally distributed across the remaining 1 6 If the assumption that risky output in the bad state is lower than the international interest rate is removed, some of the most able agents can finance the risky project through debt, even at p=0. This means that the upper bound for the threshold ability becomesπ < 1 s.t.πv(A− r)+ (1−π)v(ϕA− r) = v(B), and stock market size is G (π) − G (π * ). All results hold, after this relabeling. 1 7 Notice that this numerical solution is for qualitative rather than quantitative purposes. Therefore, the technological parameters are not calibrated to the actual data. 
Closed economy
In this section, I show briefly how the economy can be closed without affecting the main results discussed so far. Details of the analysis are provided in the appendix. Assume that capital and intermediate goods can no longer be imported or exported. It follows that their prices will be pinned down by domestic demand and supply:
, and
Further, capital will follow the law of motion:
where the RHS is aggregate savings. Aggregate capital is allocated between the final good sector and risky activities:
The aggregate supply of intermediate goods, X t , equals total production of safe and risky projects:
Optimal technology adoption maintains the threshold property of Lemma 1, since agents take prices as given and the risky payoffs are still increasing in ability. In any period, the threshold ability π * t satisfies:
Differently from the small open economy, equilibrium payoffs w t (π i ) now depend also on the capital used in the final sector, K Y t .
Equations (5) and ( 
Estimation strategies
Cross-section
To test the predictions of the model, I estimate the following static equation:
where g i(t−k,t) is the Gini coefficient observed in country i over the period between t − k and t, the terms in x i(t−k,t) are additional explanatory variables, and smdev i(t−k,t) is the measure of stock market development. All variables are expressed in logaritm. To test both versions of result (2), I use two proxies for smdev: the ratios of stock market capitalization over GDP (smcap) and over credit to the private sector (smpr). The second variable measures the weight of equity finance over the total external finance (broadly, equity plus debt). It has also been used in the literature to proxy the overall degree of risk-sharing that can be achieved through the financial market. I select the regressors in x i(t−k,t) so as to match the technology and skill parameters of the model with observable counterparts, and to control for factors commonly given attention in the empirical literature on inequality.
x i(t−k,t) includes time t − k GDP and GDP squared to account for technology and the Kuznets hypothesis. I take two measures of the initial education attainment to proxy both the level and the dispersion of human capital. In particular, I use the share of the population aged above 25, with some secondary education (sec 25), and the Gini coefficient for the years of education in the population aged above 15 (gh_15). I control for government expenditure and trade openness to check the robustness of the results, and replace g i(t−k,t) with g it for sensitivity analysis. Result (2) is confirmed by the data if
Notice, however, that g in the model may start to decline with smdev at high levels of stock market development that are rarely observed. As a consequence, the significance ofγ 2 might be weak in the data.
Equation ( (1) and (3)), I also estimate equation (6) by Two-Stages Least Squares, using a number of investor protection indicators as instruments for smdev i(t−k,t) : 
Fixed and random effects
To test if the results of the paper hold both across countries and over time, I use the panel data methodology and estimate the following equation:
where g it is the Gini coefficient observed in country i over a five-year period t, the terms in x it and smdev it are the same as for equation (6), and η t , ν t and it are unobservable country-and time-specific effects, and the error term, respectively. I estimate equation (7) under the alternative hypotheses of a random versus fixed idiosyncratic component η i .
Fixed-effects estimates capture the evolution of the relationship within each country over time. Random effects are more efficient, since they exploit all the information available across countries and over time. However, the latter may be inconsistent if country-specific effects are correlated with the residuals. Including time fixed effects in both regressions allows me to account for the presence of trends, such as skill-biased technical change, which drives inequality worldwide. I rely on the Hausman test for the choice between FE and RE, and an F test for the inclusion of time dummies.
Dynamic Panel Data
As a further evaluation of result (2) in a dynamic setting, I follow the approach of the latest studies on growth and inequality, and focus on the expression:
Notice that the specification in equation ( and Blundell and Bond (1998). 18 I time-differentiate both sides of (8) to obtain
and estimate the system of equations (8) and (9) . The differences in the variables that are either endogenous or predetermined can be instrumented with their own lagged values, while lagged differences are instruments for levels. For instance, I use g it−3 as an instrument for ∆g it−1 and smdev it−2 for ∆smdev it , as well as ∆g it−2 and ∆smdev it−1 for g it−1 and smdev it . The estimation is performed with a two-step System-GMM technique.
The restrictions, and a test of second-order serial correlation of the residuals, respectively. As pointed out by Arellano and Bond (1991) , the estimates from the first step are more efficient, while the test statistics from the second step are more robust. Therefore, I will report coefficients and statistics from the first and second step, respectively. The data on legal origins are taken from the World Development Indicators. Table 2 reports the Ordinary Least Squares estimates for different versions of equation (6).
Results
Cross-sectional regressions
Columns 1-10 suggest human capital and stock market development to be the major forces driving income inequality over the sample of 69 countries. As predicted by the model,γ 1 is positive and significant for both stock market capitalization and its ratio to private credit, whileγ 2 is negative, though only significant for smpr. Notice that, according to these estimates, stock market development should start reducing inequality after reaching levels so high that five countries at most would be on the declining part of the Gini (smcap)
schedule, and nine in the case of Gini (smpr). Thus, it seems that only very few countries have reached the point where the relationship between stock market size and inequality becomes negative. This may explain the low statistical significance forγ 2 . Moreover, the model predicts that inequality should never completely revert, even when the stock market achieves its maximum development; hence, it is reasonable to expect the linear term to be generally more relevant, as is the case in Table 2 .
The significantly negative coefficients on sec 25 through columns 1-4 and 9-10, in line more complicated way to account for the variety of sources; see Dollar and Kraay (2002) for details.
with most empirical evidence, mean that inequality tends to be lower, the larger is the share of the population with high education. The positive and significant estimates for gh_15 in columns 5-8 show that the dispersion of human capital boosts income inequality.
However, the coefficients for sec 25 and gh_15 jointly estimated (Columns 9-10) suggest that the former is more effective at reducing inequality than the latter is at raising it.
Given that sec 25 dominates gh_15, I will henceforth report the results obtained with sec 25 only. Finally, for the Kuznets hypothesis to hold, the estimated coefficients of GDP and (GDP ) 2 should be positive and negative, respectively. The results in Table 2 do not allow me to validate this hypothesis, due to the lack of significance of both coefficients. The results in Table 2 support the main prediction of the model on the relationship between stock market development and income inequality, but cannot provide evidence on the mechanism generating it, starting from investor protection. To ascertain that investor protection does not affect income inequality unless through stock market development, I
first regress the Gini coefficient on the control variables in x and LLS's indicator of investor protection, and then add smdev. Table 3 shows that investor_pr indeed has a positive and significant effect on income inequality. However, the coefficients in columns 2 and 3 suggest that this effect is absorbed by stock market development, once controlled for.
Moreover, columns 3 and 5 support the hypothesis that investor protection has no effect on inequality, unless paired by a thicker stock market. These results suggest that investor protection only affects income inequality through the development of equity markets.
The instrumental variables estimates reported in Tables 4 and 5 coefficients for almost all covariates (also sec 25 loses significance in one case). However, the coefficient estimates from the first step suggest the existence of collinearity between the two sets of instruments, which undermines the validity of this specification. 20 So far, I have regressed average Gini coefficients on average stock market development.
To verify if the results are sensitive to the timing of observations, the estimates of Tables   2 and 4 are replicated in two alternative ways. First, I replace the average Gini with its latest available observation and keep the regressors as in the previous estimates. The results are reported in Table 6 . As a further check, I focus on the period 1985-2000 and regress the average Gini on the initial values of smcap and smpr. In this case, I do not need to perform instrumental variables estimations. As shown by Table 6b , one third of the observations gets lost. This can partly motivate the insignificance of γ 2 , since a relevant part of the countries on the right-hand side of the hump is missing. Overall, this evidence favors the existence of a positive γ 1 , and a weaker negative γ 2 .
Finally, the robustness of the results is tested in Table 7 , which reports the estimates of equation (7) where government expenditure and trade (as a ratio of GDP) are added as additional covariates. There are no major changes from Tables 2 and 4 , and the additional coefficients are not significantly different from zero.
Panel regressions
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 8 report the coefficients of equation (7) estimated with fixed and random effects, respectively. Stock market development significantly affects income 2 0 I have also estimated the equations in coulumns 1 and 3 of Table 4 after excluding from the sample the countries with smcap and smpr higher than 100 per cent. The coefficientsγ 1 were higher than in Table  4 , suggesting that the relationship tends to revert when stock markets are big enough. These results are available upon request. The Kuznets hypothesis is not validated by the results in Table 8 . The results for the stock market as a ratio of private credit in the last two columns of Table 8 confirm the existence of a positive γ 1 , but do not provide strong support for γ 2 < 0. In conclusion, the static panel analysis suggests that stock market development plays as important a role as education in shaping income distribution.
The regression in column 3 of Table 8 to some extent controls for the time variation in the relationship between changes in stock market development and income inequality within countries and across time. However, it does not account for the existence of dynamic feedbacks between inequality and stock market development. To overcome these methodological limitations, I adopt the approach of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), and estimate various versions of system (8)
-(9).
The results in Table 9 confirm the existence of a significant positive linear relationship between the Ginis and stock market development. The quadratic term is also significant and exhibits the expected negative sign, in the estimates for smpr. The positive γ 1 survives the inclusion of time, as well as time-continent effects. 21 All estimated coefficients for d log (Gini t−1 ) support the convergence hypothesis for income inequality, as in previous empirical work by Benabou (1996) , Lopez (2003) and Ravallion (2002) . As in the previous evidence, the Kuznets' hypothesis finds no support and the effectiveness of human capital becomes weaker.
To make the results from dynamic and static panel regressions comparable, I replicate the Fixed and Random Effects estimates on the restricted sample and report the coefficients in Table 10 . The linear term for stock market development still has a positive and significant effect throughout all estimates, while theγ 2 are non-significantly different from zero in all specifications.
As a robustness check, I re-estimate the equations in Tables 9-10 with government expenditure and trade over GDP as additional regressors. Table 11 reports the estimated coefficients for stock market capitalization, both in linear and non-linear terms, and for the new control variables. Both static and dynamic regressions support the prediction of a positive γ 1 , while the negative γ 2 is only significant in the system-GMM for smpr. The 
Summary
The estimates reported in this section suggest that stock market development tends to raise income inequality. The declining part of the hump predicted by the model is supported in a less robust way by the data. This evidence can be reconciled with the model, since the peak of the Gini coefficient may only occur at such high levels of stock market development that are not observed in the sample. Dynamic Panel Data estimates suggest the relationship between stock market development and income inequality to hold in the long run, as predicted by the general equilibrium version of the model. Results from the cross-sectional regressions confirm the prediction that investor protection only affects income inequality through the development of the equity market.
Conclusions
This paper provides theoretical predictions and empirical support for a systematic relationship between investor protection, financial development and income inequality. I develop an overlapping generation model with risk-averse agents, heterogeneous in their ability, where production can take place with a safe or a risky technology. In the presence of financial frictions, arising from the non-observability of realizations and imperfect investor protection, I study the occupational and financial choices for different ability groups. Better investor protection promotes financial development and affects income inequality in a number of ways. First, it improves risk sharing, thereby reducing income volatility for a given size of the risky sector. Second, it raises the share of population exposed to earning risk. Finally, since ability affects risky payoffs, it increases the overall reward to ability.
The first effect tends to reduce inequality, while the other two boost it. The main result of the paper is that income dispersion increases at first with financial development, and then declines. In the empirical section, I provide evidence consistent with the predictions of the model.
A Proofs
Lemma 1
The assumptions that A > B+ r and ϕA < B+ r together with continuity of V i in π i imply the existence of a unique point π * ∈ (0, 1) where V * = B. From this, it follows that r) , and for
To prove that π * is a threshold, I just need to show that V i is increasing in π i . The derivative of V i w. r. t. π i under the optimal equity contract is
Lemma 2
To prove that the threshold ability is decreasing in investor protection, I obtain the derivative of π * with respect to p, dπ * dp = − dV dp
and show that it is negative. I have derived dV dπ * > 0 in the proof of Lemma 1. I just need to derive dV dp
Notice that dV dp > 0 for any π, since utility is concave. It follows that dπ * dp < 0. To prove that the threshold is convex in investor protection, I need to prove that d 2 π * (dp)
All terms divided by dV dπ are positive, since the CRRA specification of the utility function implies that v 0 l > v 0 h and v 00 l < v 00 h , and dπ * dp ≤ 0. Therefore,
Proposition 1
To prove the increasing monotonicity of stock market size, and its concavity at high levels of investor protection, I derive dsm dp = −g (π * ) dπ * dp d 2 sm (dp
From Lemma 1, dπ * dp ≤ 0, that implies dsm dp ≥ 0; hence, the stock market size is increasing in investor protection. From Lemma 2,
(dp)
Stock market as a ratio of GDP is increasing in investor protection, d
sm Y dp ≥ 0 for any p ∈ [0, 1], since dπ * dp ≤ 0 and the term in brackets is always positive. To prove concavity of sm Y in a neighborhood of p = 1, I derive
As lim p→1 dπ * dp = 0, while d 2 π * (dp)
To prove non monotonicity, I differentiate V ar (w) with respect to p: dV ar (w) dp = dπ * dp
Notice that the term in the first two lines represents the market size effect and is positive for all p, while the last line accounts for the risk sharing effect and is negative for all p.
dV ar (w) dp = − dπ * dp g (1) (A − B − r) 2 > 0.
dπ * dp → 0. I study how dV ar(w) dp approaches zero in a left neighborhood of p = 1 by means of Taylor's first-order approximation. Notice that d 2 V ar (w) (dp)
It follows that, in a neighborhood to the left of p = 1, dV ar (w) dp
Proposition 2
Recall from Proposition 1 that sm is increasing in p. I characterize the relationship between stock market size and the variance of earnings by studying dV ar (w) dsm = dV ar (w) dp µ dsm dp
¢¤ A− r = B, and dπ * dp → 0. It thus follows that
< 0, since v 00 < 0 for any CRRA utility function.
B Closed economy B.1 The dynamics
The dynamics of the closed economy satisfies equations (4) and (5):
As noticed in section 4, earnings depend on factor prices, which are functions of π * t and capital employed in the final sector,
. This implies that the threshold ability π * t becomes an implicit function of K t and the analytical characterization of the dynamic equilibrium becomes awkward. Therefore, I proceed by means of numerical (A −B) ), the interest rate is so high relative to the price of the intermediate good that no young agent chooses the risky technology. Hence, there is no stock market and inequality is zero. As capital is accumulated, the interest rate falls and the price of intermediates rises. When the ratio r/χ becomes low enough, some young agents prefer the risky project and raise capital through equities. This requires a shift of capital out of the final good sector, which in turn tends to raise r and lower χ. As a result, with capital accumulation and an expanding stock market, r/χ falls by less than it would in the absence of the risky technology. Also, a positive stock market size implies that some income inequality arises due to the "market size" effect, as in the model of sections 2-3. Moreover, the ratio between factor prices, r/χ, also affects inequality by changing the earnings differentials between safe and risky entrepreneurs. The lower the ratio, the wider the earnings differentials, the higher inequality ("relative factor prices" effect). This implies that, with endogenous prices, inequality may vary even if stock market size does not. The adjustment of capital and prices continues until the steady state is reached.
Decreasing marginal productivity of capital guarantees the existence of the steady state. Figure 5 shows the adjustment after a policy change that increases investor protection from p = 0 to p = 0.05, starting from the steady state. Due to the convexity of π * t in p, the risky intermediate sector expands remarkably in response to the policy change.
The marginal productivity of capital rises sharply both because some capital is shifted to the risky sector and because the production of intermediates increases. This causes an overshooting of the interest rate, that gradually declines with capital accumulation to its new (higher) steady state level. Inequality immediately jumps up and oscillates around its new (higher) steady state level until capital and prices are stable.
If the policy change occurs at high levels of investor protection, the effect on produc- tivity of factors (hence prices) is weaker. An increase in p induces a small shift of capital from the final to the risky intermediate sector, and has almost no effect on the interest rate. Inequality falls, since the "risk sharing" effect outweighs the "market size" effect at high levels of investor protection.
B.2 The steady state
In the steady state, K t+1 = K t = K and π * t+1 = π * t = π * . The equilibrium is the solution to the system:
The risky intermediate sector is active, at least in the presence of perfect investor protection, provided that A− B >
Comparative statics for p in the steady state are depicted in Figure 6 showing that Lemmas 1-3 and Propositions 1-2 continue to hold in the closed economy. In fact, the "relative factor prices" effect, that affects inequality along the dynamics, is irrelevant in the steady state. Therefore, the comparative statics on investor protection is driven by the "market size" and "risk sharing" effects only, as in the small open economy.Simulation details secondary and tertiary education (q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , respectively):
The average years of schooling and their variance are then
with l 0 = lu, l 1 = lp, l 2 = ls and l 3 = lh. Group the countries in low-income, middle-income and high-income following the WDI criterion and take the average values of E (Q) and V (Q). Finally, µ and σ can be derived from the expressions for mean and variance of the Lognormal distribution: 
5. For every degree of investor protection p (a) compute π * (p) as the solution to the technology choice problem. In particular, recursively find the point in the grid of π * satisfying:
(b) For every ability π i. draw the earning realization:
ii. sort w and derive its cumulative density function as F (w i ) = 
When simulating the closed economy, step 1 does not specify r.
Step 5.(a) finds the threshold ability π * t (p) which solves (10) for a given initial capital K t , taking into account that
After step 5.(c), capital in the next period is computed as Table A Note: C and P stand for cross-sectional and panel datasets, respectively. L and S for large and small samples. The dependent variable is the average Gini coeffi cient between 1980 and 2000. GDP and education are the initial values, stock market development is the average. All regressions include a dummy for Latin America.
Coeffi cients are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares. Robust standard errors within parenthesis, 5%
and 10% significant coeffi cients in bold and italics, respectively. T .227
(.097)
.293
(.108) 
No No
The dependent variable is the Gini coeffi cient. Sample of 52 (50) .060
(.090)
.069 (.102) .073 (.102) .054 (.195) .058 (.118) .029
(.073)
.045
(. (9) plus (log difference of ) government expenditure, trade and private credit as a ratio of GDP. FE are fixed and random effects regressions, chosen on the basis of specification tests, whose statistics are available upon request. GMM are Arellano-Bover two-step system-GMM estimations, where differences of all regressors are instrumented with lagged levels and levels with lagged differences. Coefficients are from the first step, p-values for Sargan and m2 tests are from the second. Standard errors are reported within parenthesis, 5% and 10% significant coeffi cients in bold and italics.
